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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we suggest an interpretation of the concept of ‘relational value’ that could be 
useful in both environmental ethics and empirical analyses. We argue that relational valuing 
includes aspects of intrinsic and instrumental valuing. If relational values are attributed, 
objects are appreciated because the relationship with them contributes to the human 
flourishing component of well-being (instrumental aspect). At the same time, attributing 
relational value involves genuine esteem for the valued item (intrinsic aspect). We also 
introduce the notions of mediating and indirect relational environmental values, attributed in 
relationships involving people as well as environmental objects. We close by proposing how 
our analysis can be used in empirical research.  
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Let us imagine a particular forest in which we played as children and where we still 
sometimes go to take a walk to think through a difficult decision. In this forest we know the 
little clearing, where we sometimes see deer at dusk and a place with wild raspberries in 
summer. This forest is simultaneously a home to us and a place for a change of scene. We 
admire its beauty and the diversity of living beings it entails and we cherish it because it 





what type of value is this? Do we value the forest instrumentally for the sake of its 
contribution to our well-being or do we attribute intrinsic value to it, when we value it for its 
own sake? In this article we argue that neither of the two value categories can capture the 
described value of the forest; we are faced with a third type of environmental value, namely 
relational value. 
Recently environmental relational values have received attention not only as a concept 
in environmental policy (Pascual et al. 2017, IPBES 2018) but also as a tool in the social 
sciences, to investigate how people actually value nature (Chapman et al. 2019, Klain et al. 
2017, Sheremata 2018). In environmental policy, ecosystem services have commonly been 
used to understand the value of nature to humans since the publication of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (e.g. MEA 2003). A subcategory, cultural ecosystem services, were 
later defined as: ‘ecosystems' contributions to the non-material benefits (e.g., capabilities and 
experiences) that arise from human–ecosystem relationships’ (Chan et al. 2012: p.9). The 
‘relational value’ concept was proposed in part as a response to some of the shortcomings of 
the ‘ecosystem services’ metaphor. While ‘relational value’ retains the central element of 
human-ecosystem relationships it diverges from the idea of values as services provided by 
ecosystems. Instead, relational values, the authors emphasize, are ‘preferences, principles and 
virtues associated with relationships’ (Chan et al. 2016: p.1462). Relational values were 
proposed to add a hitherto missing component in the dominant discussion on how people 
value their natural environment: an account of values that are both non-instrumental yet 
anthropocentric1 and the possibility to break the intrinsic/instrumental value dichotomy (e.g. 
Pascual et al. 2017, Tallis and Lubchenco 2014) .  
In this paper we seek to connect the above empirically-oriented literature to the 
discourse in environmental ethics as a philosophical discipline, which—we hope—can be 
enriching for both fields. Empirical research benefits from the logic and structure of 
philosophy, which may strengthen some of the theoretical underpinning and help to 
communicate the complex concept to a wider audience. Environmental ethics will gain from 
the grounding in real world examples to challenge theoretical assumptions and to adapt theory 
to the normative ‘untidiness’ of environmental conflicts. In that sense, this study is aimed at 
increasing our analytic understanding of differences and similarities between the three 
	
1 We interpret ‘anthropocentric values’ as the values brought forward in anthropocentric arguments for 
environmental protection i.e. arguments based on the value that nature provides for humans as the only entities 





categories of environmental values and to develop a framework to facilitate empirical analysis 
and identification of relational values.  
We draw on environmental philosophy to propose the integration of the relational 
value concept into a value-pluralistic account of environmental ethics. In doing so, we aim at 
retaining some of the core elements of relational value as described in the non-philosophical 
literature: 1) relational values are different from instrumental and intrinsic values; 2) 
relational value is about human relationships facilitated by, as well as directly with, nature; 3) 
the objects of relational value are not substitutable; and 4) relational value is connected to 
eudaimonia. We adhere to these core elements to connect the relational values and 
environmental ethics literatures, and for a consistent account of relational value across 
disciplines. However, our account of relational value differs in two respects. First, we 
understand principles, preferences and virtues, as responses to relational value rather than 
speaking of these three normative concepts themselves as values, as suggested in the quote 
above. While this is an important distinction for an environmental ethics analysis, we think 
we capture the original definition’s meaning. Second, some authors understand eudaimonic 
values (values that contribute to human well-being by supporting a good, flourishing life) as a 
subcategory of relational values (Muraca 2011, Himes and Muraca 2018, Chan et al. 2018). 
We discuss relational values as eudaimonic values. 
We start our analysis by describing relational valuing as a type of valuing that includes 
aspects of instrumental and intrinsic valuing. Then, we argue that relational values can play a 
role in both antropocentric as well as physiocentric2 arguments for the importance of nature. 
Finally, to account for the complexity of relational values encountered in empirical data, we 
introduce the notions of mediating or indirect relational values that concern relationships in 
which usually both humans and natural items play a role as valued objects. In this article we 
thus develop a philosophical analysis of how people value environmental objects when 
relational, instrumental or intrinsic values are attributed; in so doing, we focus on the structure 
or ‘syntax’ of these values. We provide neither an ontological theory of what constitutes 
environmental values nor any normative arguments as to why or under which conditions these 
values deserve moral consideration.  
 
	
2 Following, for instance, Ott, Dierks, and Boget-Kleschin (2016), we use the term ‘physiocentric’ as an 
umbrella for positions which attribute moral considerability to non-human entities in the natural environment, 







In this article we understand environmental values as values ascribed by people to natural 
items in the environment such as individual animals and plants, but also whole landscapes, 
ecosystems, species, the whole of nature/earth, or anything else in our natural surroundings. 
While the philosophical literature on values often understands ‘valuing’ as ‘desiring’ (e.g. 
Korsgaard 1983, Kagan 1998), in environmental philosophy valuing usually means 
‘attributing importance, or relevance’. Environmental objects can be so valued in an 
instrumental, intrinsic or relational sense and all of these values are used in arguments for 
environmental protection. Each of these three types of environmental value is attributed in 
virtue of another feature of the object (its usefulness, its own properties, or its relationship 
with the valuer). When relational value is attributed to an object, that object is valued in virtue 
of the particular relationship in which it stands to the subject. In the relational values literature 
this is called ‘the content’ of value, valuation or valuing (Himes and Muraca 2018, Chan et al. 
2018)3. While relationships are the content of relational valuing, in the case of instrumental 
values, we value an object in virtue of its being useful to satisfying human needs and interests. 
We thus refer to ‘usefulness’ as the content of this type of valuing. Analogously, we suggest 
that the content of intrinsic valuing would be the object’s own properties, in virtue of which it 
is being valued.  
VALUING RELATIONS 
In the first chapter of their book Environmental Values, John O’Neill, Alan Holland and 
Andrew Light observe that natural environments matter to us humans in different ways. The 
authors describe three modes, in which we relate to our environments:4  
First, we live from them – they are the means to our existence. Second, we live in 
them – they are our homes and familiar places in which everyday life takes place and 
draws its meaning, and in which personal and social histories are embodied. Third, we 
live with them – our lives take place against the backdrop of a natural world that 
	
3 We speak of the content of valuing, because our analysis focuses of valuing in the sense of attributing 
environmental value. Himes and Muraca speak of relationships as the content of valuation (2018), Chan, Gould 
and Pascual refer to values that are relational in content (2018). 
4 Arias-Arévalo et al. and Himes & Muraca used a similar distinction, changing the ‘living with’ category into 
‘living for’ probably in order to highlight an ‘altruistic’ aspect often associated with intrinsic values (Arias-





existed before us and will continue to exist beyond the life of the last human, a world 
that we enter and for which awe and wonder are appropriate responses. (2008: p.1) 
 
As noted by others (Arias-Arevalo et al. 2018, Himes and Muraca 2018), these modes 
of relating with the environment, with their different ways in which natural environments 
matter to us, recall the three categories of environmental values: instrumental (living from), 
relational (living in) and intrinsic (living with). 
Depending on how people relate to a natural item (to which we refer here as the valued 
object) they ascribe different types of value to it. We call these relations between the valuer 
and the valued object ‘valuing relations’. To prevent misunderstandings, we use the terms 
‘relation’ and ‘relationship’ with different meanings. ‘Relation’ stands for the valuing relation 
between the valuing subject and the valued object. In contrast, the term ‘relationship’ refers to 
the content of valuing in the case of relational values. We thus speak of valuing relations for 
all three types of environmental values, but of relationships as the content that is specific for 
relational values.5 
This understanding of valuing relations is compatible with both subjective and 
objective theories of value, particularly if value objectivism is understood in a weak sense as, 
for instance, represented by Nicolas Rescher, who writes:  
The question of whether or not (and if so to what extent) a state of affairs has value 
does not ask whether you or I or X values it: it is not a question about the personal, 
idiosyncratic, subjective stance of particular individuals. Rather what it asks – 
impersonally, generally, and objectively is whether people should value it – that is 
whether, given the realities of the human situation, ideally reasonable and 
conscientious people are well advised to value it. (2005: p.122–123).  
 
The valuing relation refers to the connection between the valuing subject and the 
valued object, which is established by a valuing process that plays a role in subjective as well 
as objective value theories. The two types of theory disagree concerning what happens during 
this valuing process. While value subjectivists hold that the valuer generates values in the 
	
5 Likewise, Chan, Gould and Pasqual highlight that ‘all values are relational in origin’ (here: relation between A 
and B) whereas with the concept of ‘relational value’ they focus on those that are „relational in content’ (here: 





valuing process, value objectivists understand the process in these relations as a recognition 
of value or of evaluative features associated with the object. We will thus use the phrases 
‘value ascription’ and ‘value attribution’, to include objectivist and subjectivist views.6  
 
THE DIFFERENT DIRECTIIONALITIES OF VALUING RELATIONS 
Building on the works of Muraca and O’Neill et al. we start from the relation between the 
valuing subject and the valued object to examine the differences between the three categories 
of environmental values. To distinguish and compare the valuing relations behind intrinsic, 
instrumental and relational values, we describe them as being directional. The distinction 
between the different directions in environmental valuing relations is developed not as an 
ontological theory but as a heuristic tool to illustrate similarities and differences between the 
different types of environmental value. In short, the intrinsic valuing relation is described as 
unidirectional, directed from the valuing subject A to the valued object B: AàB. The relation 
of instrumental valuing is described as unidirectional from the object B to the subject A: AßB 
and that of relational valuing as bidirectional between object and subject: A ⇆ B [Figure 1, 
Table 1].7 In this understanding of directionality, the direction of the valuing relation is not 
determined by the direction of the valuing process, which always directs from subject A to 
object B. Instead, the direction of the valuing relation illustrates whether the value is oriented 
towards the valuing subject (instrumental values AßB) or is appreciated by the subject as 
something in the object (intrinsic value AàB). We are not claiming that the instrumental 
valuing relation is an inversion of the intrinsic valuing relation, which it cannot be due to the 
entirely different roles of subjects and objects in valuing relations. In our account, an 
environmental object cannot take the role of a valuer.8 The directionality says something 
about why and how the object is being valued; it is valued for the sake of the valuer (AßB) or 
for the sake of the object itself (AàB). In that sense, this heuristic model illustrates towards 
which element the respective valuing relation is oriented. Accordingly, instrumental values 
	
6 We consider our interpretation of ‘value ascription’ and ‘value attribution’ also to be compatible with Muraca’s 
‘relationalist value theory’, which has been developed as an alternative to value objectivism and subjectivism 
(Himes and Muraca 2018, Muraca 2011). However, we do not endorse Muraca’s Whiteheadian ontological 
assumptions according to which ‘relations are ontological prior to and constitutive of entities rather than being 
conceived as external link(ing) between them’(Muraca 2016: p.19). 
7 The representation of the relational valuing relation as bidirectional seems intuitively plausible since other 
authors have depicted relational values with double-headed arrows between valuing subject and valued object, 
albeit without explanation on how the bidirectionality should be understood (Chan et al. 2016, Piccolo 2017). 
8 As will be elaborated later, our account excludes non-human valuers for intrinsic and relational (not for 






are sometimes described as ‘anthropocentric values’ (centering on the human valuer as the 
morally considerable entity) and intrinsic values as ‘non-anthropocentric values’ (centering on 
the not necessarily human object as a morally considerable entity) (e.g. Pascual et al. 2017, 




Many authors have highlighted that ‘intrinsic value’ is an ambiguous concept and that its 
different meanings often tend to be conflated (e.g. Korsgaard 1983, Kagan 1998, McShane 
2016, O'Neill 2003, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). Most authors in 
environmental ethics highlight that entities with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake, 
an interpretation of intrinsic value which is sometimes called final value (e.g. McShane 2016, 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). The contrast-category to intrinsic value, in this 
sense, is instrumental value, which is attributed if something is valued as a means to an end 
for the sake of those for whom it is useful. The final value interpretation of intrinsic value is 
often distinguished from a ‘Moorean’ understanding, according to which intrinsic value is 
based on the intrinsic properties of the valued object (e.g. O'Neill 2003). This property-based 
account of intrinsic value has been widely criticized (e.g. Kagan 1998, Korsgaard 1983, 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). Environmental and animal ethics theories often 
imply a notion of ‘intrinsic’ value that is also based on particular properties of the value 
bearer, for instance, animal ethicists who argue that animals have intrinsic value due to their 
sentience (e.g. Regan) or biocentrists who argue that living organisms have intrinsic value 
because they have a good or interests of their own (e.g. Goodpaster 1978, Taylor 1986, 
Varner 1998). According to these authors, attributing intrinsic value means: to value entities 
on account of their own, valuer-independent properties. In other words, intrinsic value is 
attributed to an object in acknowledgement of its particular properties independently of the 
relevance that the object has for the valuer. To value an item in this sense, means to value it 
for its own sake. In such an interpretation of intrinsic value, final value is thus associated with 
certain valuer-independent properties of the object. In many cases the listed properties are 
intrinsic properties. However, such an account of intrinsic value is also compatible with the 
notion of valuing an entity in virtue of a relational property such as ‘rarity’. The relevant 
aspect about these properties is that they are not related to the valuer (in contrast to cases of 





are not excluded by this understanding. Therefore, in spite of the reference to the item’s own 
properties, this account of intrinsic value is not identical with the widely criticized Moorean 
account according to which the relevant properties are not based on relations to any other 
object.  
Returning to the valuing relations described by O’Neill et al, intrinsic value is ascribed 
in the relation of living with our natural environments (O’Neill et al. 2008). In our account we 
describe this relation as a valuing direction from the valuing subject A towards the valued 
object B (AàB). By highlighting that they live with the object, valuers express their respect 
for it as a full ‘partner’ in their environment; they therefore value it for its own sake. The 
valuing relation is insofar directed towards object B as the value is ascribed to or ‘remains’ in 
B. A acknowledges this value in B, and appreciates B for its own sake. 
 
Instrumental valuing  
As a second type we discuss the valuing relation associated with instrumental value, ‘living 
from nature’. As indicated by the preposition ‘from’ this relation can be seen as being directed 
from the valued object B to the valuing subject A (AßB); A values B in virtue of its 
usefulness for A. The valuing relation is directed from B to A because in the end it is A who 
benefits from the value; the value ‘is oriented towards’ A. Objects which are being valued in 
this instrumental sense are valued as a means to the satisfaction of interests and needs of A, 
which is a component of A’s well-being. 
 
Relational valuing 
We now turn to the third way in which individuals, processes and places in our environment 
matter to us: living in these environments (O’Neill et al 2008). This type of mattering to us 
was described in the forest scene at the outset and is captured by the concept of ‘relational 
value’. If B (e.g. the forest) matters to A in this way, then A values B in virtue of a particular 
relationship that A has with B. Relational values are often associated with eudaimonia (e.g. 
Chan et al. 2018, Knippenberg et al. 2018, Muraca 2011). We understand eudaimonia in an 
Aristotelian interpretation as human flourishing that is achieved through living ‘a good life’ in 
the sense of a meaningful, virtuous life. Eudaimonia as human flourishing is another 
component of human well-being besides the component of satisfaction of needs and interests 





being attributed, are themselves components of human flourishing. When subject A values B 
in virtue of such a relationship, A attributes meaning and significance to B, which comes with 
a sense of responsibility, care, and genuine esteem for object B (Chan et al. 2016, Chan et al. 
2018, Jax et al. 2018, Knippenberg et al. 2018, West et al. 2018).9 Consequently, the object in 
question is also valued for its own sake but in a different way than in case of intrinsic value. A 
house plant (B), for-instance, can have meaning and significance for someone (A). A then 
values this plant for its own sake even if A does not value other plants for their own sake. In 
this case A thus values B for its own sake based on its relational not its intrinsic value. 
One of the characteristic features of relational values, as highlighted by other authors 
(e.g. Himes and Muraca 2018, Muraca 2011, O'Neill 2019), is that B cannot be substituted by 
another item of the same type, because A stands in a relationship with this particular B. In the 
forest scene described earlier, the relationship with the forest depends on unique and specific 
features of and experiences in that particular forest.10 In contrast, in instrumental valuing the 
object is substitutable because the same usefulness can be realized by other objects.  
A valuer A can simultaneously ascribe relational and instrumental and/or intrinsic 
value to an object B. For instance, a farmer (A) may attribute instrumental as well as relational 
value to a cow (B). After the cow’s death, its instrumental value can be replaced by another 
cow, which also gives milk. However, the particular relational value of the first cow is lost. A 
new relationship may be formed with a new cow (B), to which the farmer (A) again attributes 
relational value. But the new cow has another meaning for the farmer (A), it is part of a 
different relationship and the farmer (A) thus attributes a qualitatively different relational 
value to B.  
Such an understanding of the subject-object relation in relational valuing is depicted 
by the bidirectionality (A⇆B). A values B, because B contributes to A’s flourishing and thus to 
A’s well-being; this is the aspect that relational value has in common with instrumental value 
and that gives the relational valuing relation the AßB direction. However, the component of 
	
9 This focus on ‘meaning’ in a third type of environmental values can also be found in Simon James’ discussion 
on constitutive values (James 2019, 2020). He introduces these values with the proposition that ‘in many cases 
[…] natural entities have value, not because they are means to certain ends, but because they are parts of certain 
meaningful wholes’ (2019: p.3). In a recent article James uses the term ‘constitutive value’ to describe the value 
of the meaningful relationship and he uses ‘cultural value’ or ‘relational value’ to refer to the associated value of 
the natural entity involved in the meaningful relationship (2020). 
10 Environmental relational values do not necessarily concern specific places or organisms as objects B. A 
subject A can ascribe relational value to a species. A may form a particular relationship with, for instance, a fish 
species B with particular spiritual, aesthetic, or cultural significance. Here the individual fish can be substituted 
for another fish of the same species, but the species itself cannot be substituted for another species. The species 





well-being to which instrumental value contributes is the satisfaction of needs and interests, 
and object B is valued on account of its usefulness towards this purpose. In contrast, when 
relational value is attributed, B is valued for its contribution to human flourishing as a 
component of well-being.11 Such a contribution to human flourishing is achieved rather than 
received. Achievement involves a certain attitude and behavior towards the valued object B. 
This type of relationship between A and B is thus characterized by a sense of responsibility 
and care in A for the object B.12 As a result of this relationship A also values B for its own 
sake not only for its positive effect on A. Relational value has this aspect in common with 
intrinsic value, it gives the relational valuing relation the AàB direction. In relational valuing 
the two directions always occur together. The contribution to well-being cannot be enjoyed 
without attributing significance and meaning to B. In turn, this attribution is always associated 
with a specific relationship as a component of human flourishing. The bidirectionality is not 
to suggest that relational valuing combines instrumental and intrinsic valuing but only that 
certain aspects of ascribing the other two types of value occur when relational values are 
being attributed. In each direction, relational valuing is different from the respective 
unidirectional valuing. Relational valuing contrasts with instrumental valuing, with respect to 
the component of well-being that is involved and with respect to the substitutability of object 
B. And unlike intrinsic value, relational value depends on a relationship with the valuer, 
which is the basis for the esteem for the object.  
Based on this description of bidirectionality (A⇆B), we can now address some of the 
critical comments brought forward against the relational value concept. Patrik Baard seems to 
suggest that it was introduced to replace the concepts of instrumental and intrinsic value 
(2019). Our interpretation of relational value shows how it can be understood as a 
complementary environmental value category. Baard further states that relational value ‘can 
be accommodated in the instrumental and intrinsic value distinction’ (2019: p.196). Indeed, 
	
11 To distinguish between the two different types of contribution to human well-being, some authors (Krebs 
1999: p.67, Muraca 2011, Ott 2003) speak of ‘eudaimonistic intrinsic value’ as value that refers to ‘”good” as 
ends for humans’ in contrast to instrumental values, which refer to ‘”good” as means for humans’ (Ott 2003: 
p.159). This type of values is similar to what we call ‘relational value’ here. However, in spite of the reference to 
‘intrinsic’ in the name ‘eudaimonistic intrinsic value’ these authors do not emphasise the meaning and 
significance that valued objects have for the subject. Moreover, our account of relational value seems to be 
somewhat narrower, as we discuss the relational values of the objects with which the subject stands in a 
relationship rather than referring to the value of relationships themselves or of associated experiences. 
12 We are not claiming that all human-nature relationships are bidirectional in this sense, there are also 
exploitative relationships. However, in an exploitative relationship the object is valued only in virtue of its 
usefulness not in virtue of its relationship with the valuer, consequently it is not the relationship that is the 






our framework illustrates how one can draw on the distinction between instrumental and 
intrinsic value to explain relational value. John Piccolo is concerned that a concept of 
‘relational value’ would aim at replacing arguments based on intrinsic value and he asked for 
a clearer description of how intrinsic and relational values can coexist (2017). The analysis at 
hand provides such a description and hopefully shows that the concept of ‘relational value’ 
can be used alongside that of intrinsic value.  
Finally, Maier and Feest consider the concept of ‘relational value’ unhelpful because 
all values are relational (2016). We have shown how the valuing relations between 
instrumental, intrinsic and relational valuing can be distinguished. Moreover, echoing Himes 
and Muraca (2018), it is not the valuing relation but the relationships—in virtue of which 
objects are valued—that give relational values their name. However, we agree with Maier and 
Feest’s request for more normative work on relational values, though that is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Next we address the question: to what extent are relational values necessarily 
elements of anthropocentric arguments and how do they connect to physiocentric positions? 
 
RELATIONAL VALUE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM 
For ethical anthropocentrists the moral significance of nature depends on its relevance to 
humans; only humans are directly morally considerable and only humans are valued for their 
own sake. In contrast, physiocentrists argue that other items in nature should be valued and 
morally considered for their own sake. Some critics as well as supporters describe relational 
values as explicitly anthropocentric albeit not instrumental values (e.g. Pascual et al. 2017, 
Piccolo 2017). As mentioned before, the literature describes eudaimonic relational values as 
contributing to human well-being by enabling human flourishing rather than providing 
usefulness (Chan et al. 2018, Knippenberg et al. 2018, Muraca 2011). Does such a reference 
to human well-being require an anthropocentric position? We think not, because this 
contribution to human well-being as flourishing goes along with genuine esteem for the 
valued object. This connection is well explained by John O’Neill (1993) who echoing 
Aristotle invokes the example of friendship as an analogy to natural items.  
It is constitutive of friendship of the best kind that we care for friends for their own 
sake and not merely for the pleasures of profits they might bring. To do good for 
friends purely because one thought they might later return the compliment not for their 
own sake is to have an ill-formed friendship. Friendship in turn is a constitutive 






According to O’Neill it is thus an inherent element of friendship that friends are 
valued for their own sake; only then does friendship contribute to human flourishing and well-
being. If someone only appreciates their friend in order to feel better, this is not a case of real 
friendship and the positive effect on human well-being does not occur. Friendship in this case 
could be understood as a relationship in virtue of which relational values are being attributed 
in a social rather than an environmental context,13 but analogies can be drawn to relational 
environmental values. If A ascribes relational value to a particular forest (B) with the 
associated attribution of meaning and significance, A values this forest for its own sake, not 
only because of its beneficence for A. The forest is thus directly morally considerable for A, 
which is not the classical anthropocentric position. However, it is not a classically 
physiocentric position either, because the moral considerability is connected to the 
relationship that A has with B.  
Furthermore, the relational value concept captures central ideas of non-anthropocentric 
theories in environmental ethics: that attitudes of moral agents, context of moral interactions, 
and specific relation to the valued object are ethically relevant (e.g. Warren 1990, Palmer 
2010) and that humans live in a community with other organisms (e.g. Callicott 1999, Naess 
2003). 
 Relational value scholars such as Kai Chan and Terre Satterfield suggested earlier that 
the concept of ‘cultural ecosystem services’ may capture not only ‘anthropocentric’ but also 
‘biocentric values’ (Chan et al. 2012). Shifting from cultural ecosystem services to relational 
values can be understood as a reinforcement of this physiocentric aspect. While capturing a 
physiocentric worldview with ecosystem services seems somewhat contradictory, the 
relational value concept creates a basis to account for non-anthropocentric ideas. In our 
account, this is illustrated by the bidirectionality of the relational valuing relation in which the 
contribution to human well-being is valued as an aspect that is common with instrumental 
valuing and the genuine esteem for the valued object as a common feature with intrinsic 
valuing. The latter aspect could also be called a physiocentric element, because it entails the 
element of valuing environmental objects for their own sake. According to our interpretation 
it is thus not accurate to describe relational values as purely anthropocentric. It follows from 
	
13 In case of friendship as a relationship with other people we obviously not only attribute relational, but also 
intrinsic value. However, we also attribute intrinsic value to people who bully us; the difference between our 





the simultaneous focus on both the meaning for the human valuer and the moral 
considerability of the valued environmental objects, that neither of them is really at the center 
of moral consideration. We thus suggest that argumentation based on relational values is best 
described as ‘non-centric’.14 
 
INDIRECT AND MEDIATING VALUES 
So far, we have described direct valuing relations between a valuing subject A and a valued 
object B. However, in many situations people value their natural environment in association 
with a third party, for instance, another person or a community. We distinguish two types of 
such values involving third parties; first, mediating relational values, which are attributed to 
an environmental item C because it mediates a relationship of valuer A with a third-party B. 
Second, indirect relational values, in which A values the environmental object D due to the 
relational value that D has for third party B (for an overview see [Figure 2]). 
Although not called by these names, mediating and indirect relational values are 
important categories in the relational value literature. In the first article that suggested 
relational environmental values as a concept for environmental policy (Chan et al. 2016), the 
authors distinguished between ‘relational values involving the human collective’ and 
relational values that are ‘primarily individual’. In the ‘primarily individual’ case, A values B 
because of the direct valuing relation between A and B. When the human collective is 
involved, the valuing relation has three parties. For example, if valuer A values the 
environmental item C because C provides a vehicle for A to connect with other people B, this 
is a case of mediating relational values. In the case of indirect relational valuing, the valuer A 
might attribute indirect relational value to the environmental item D, because D is important 
to A’s community B.  
 
Mediating values 
In certain situations a valuer may value an environmental item, for instance a forest, not only 
because of the particular relationship that the valuer has with this forest itself, but also 
because the forest has a special meaning and value as a place in which the valuer goes for 
walks with her elderly parents. Here, the forest is valued because it mediates or facilitates the 
	
14 We agree with Barbara Muraca, who suggested in conversations that the same point could also be captured by 





relationship of the valuer with her parents. We speak of a mediating relational value of the 
forest in this case. The valuer A values the forest (C) because it mediates and to some extent 
serves a constitutive function in the relationship of A with the directly valued object, the 
elderly parents (B). This is not the same as a situation in which A values the forest 
instrumentally for providing an opportunity for a walk with her parents. In the instrumental 
case any other place that provides an opportunity for a nice walk has the same value. In case 
of a mediating relational value, walks in this particular forest are one aspect of the 
relationship that A has with her parents (B). If the forest were closed or cut down, not only the 
opportunity to take a walk would be lost, but also one part of the common memories that A 
shares with her parents—an element of their relationship that cannot be substituted. Besides 
this attribution of mediating relational value, A may at the same time attribute direct relational 
values to the forest for its particular meaning to A independently of her parents (B). In 
addition, A certainly attributes not only relational but also intrinsic value to her parents. To 
understand the value that the forest (C) has for A, it is important to consider all these values, 
including the mediating relational aspect.  
Is there also a category of mediating instrumental value? In a way all instrumental 
values are mediating by serving as a means towards satisfying particular needs or interests. 
However, we discuss environmental valuing here as attributing importance to environmental 
objects. In this sense mediating instrumental value is involved if an object (C) is valued 
because it mediates the instrumental value of another object (B), which on its part serves to 
satisfy particular needs. Let us think of a child (A), who likes to collect and eat hazelnuts (B). 
In order to crack these nuts, the child uses a stone (C). One could say this stone has mediating 
instrumental value because only thanks to the stone (C) the child (A) can enjoy the nuts (B). 
However, in context of instrumental values the distinction between direct and mediating 
values may be less useful than in case of relational values, because most items could be 
described as having direct or mediating instrumental value depending on the purpose 
associated with their usefulness. In the example, the stone is useful for the purpose of eating 
nuts. Nuts would themselves be of mediating instrumental value if the purpose is defined as 
nutrition, which is of mediating instrumental value for the purpose of survival.15 
	








We speak of indirect valuing when the valuer A values an environmental object D because of 
its importance for B, who is directly valued by A. For instance, I (A) consider a certain tree 
(D) to have indirect relational value not because it is particularly meaningful to me, but 
because it has relational value for my best friend (B) whom I (A) value directly. 
We can distinguish between indirect instrumental value, indirect intrinsic value and 
indirect relational value depending on how B (my best friend in the above example) values the 
environmental object D. If B values D instrumentally, for instance if B values the tree (D) 
because of its apples, D has indirect instrumental value for me (A) as B’s friend. If B is a 
biocentrist and attributes intrinsic value to trees such as D, I (A) may treat trees with a 
particular respect to honor B’s particular view and thereby I attribute indirect intrinsic value to 
trees (D). There is also a valuing relation between me (A) and my friend (B), however, in this 
article we focus on environmental values, therefore the type of value attributed to the 
environmental object D is of more interest than the valuing relation between A and B.  
 
Environmental valuers  
Could indirect values also involve non-humans as a third-party B? 16 In such cases A would 
value the environmental object D indirectly because of D’s relevance for another 
environmental object B, which is directly valued by A.  
In case of instrumental values this seems to be possible. The valuer A can observe that 
an organism B depends on another natural item D for survival. D thus has instrumental value 
for B. If A directly values B (in the intrinsic, relational or instrumental sense) A attributes 
indirect instrumental value to D. For instance, a human valuer A cherishes the beauty of a 
patch of spring flowers in her garden (B) every year and she recognizes that the annual 
flowering depends on pollinators (D). Therefore, the flower-lover (A) attributes indirect 
instrumental value to the pollinators (D) due to their instrumental value for the spring flowers 
as non-human Bs.17  
	
16 We would like to thank the ecologist Owen Petchey and Bernhard Schmid for raising this point. 
17 The case shows that indirect instrumental values involving non-human Bs can be close to mediating relational 
values. If the flower-lover A values the pollinators (C) as mediators of her relationship with the flowers (B) it is a 






What about indirect relational values involving non-human Bs? These would be cases, 
in which a non-human B, which is directly valued by A, would attribute relational value to D. 
To answer this question, it is important to remember that we interpreted relational values as 
involving aspects of instrumental as well as intrinsic valuing. The intrinsic valuing aspect 
implies that the valuer attributes genuine esteem to the valued object and values it for its own 
sake. Indirect relational values involving a non-human B would thus imply that non-humans 
can attribute meaning, significance and genuine esteem to the other objects. We expect that 
this would require a high consciousness level, including the capability of moral reflection. We 
do not want to exclude the possibility that this might apply to certain non-humans, for 
instance apes, but this is not the usual case in ecological relationships. Therefore, we do not 
extend our discussion of indirect relational or indirect intrinsic values to cases involving non-
human Bs. However, we acknowledge that there may be other knowledge systems, which 
attribute the capacity of conscious valuing to a larger spectrum of non-human entities. 
 
OUTLOOK AND APPLICATION 
With the philosophical analysis of the relational value concept we aimed at describing this 
category of environmental values in distinction from intrinsic and instrumental value. For this 
purpose we constructed examples, in which such values were attributed, to characterize them 
[e.g. Table 1, Figure 2]. However, real world interactions with the environment are usually 
more complex and messy, and the different categories may not always be so clearly separable 
as in theory. In the following we show how our analysis of environmental values could be 
applied as a framework in empirical studies. We hope that the discussion of which values are 
involved can contribute to a better understanding of real-world cases, even if they are not as 
neatly classifiable as in theory. We will speak of this as the ‘Syntax of Environmental Values 
Framework’ because it distinguishes different types of values based on the syntax or structure 




for the flowers (B) it is an indirect instrumental value. There may be good reasons to attribute both types of 





Example 1: Restoring the Creek Together 
The first example serves to demonstrate how our framework might apply to a mediating 
object (C in the Syntax of Environmental Values Framework) as well as to relational values 
involving a collective as B. In the following quote from one of the author’s studies on riparian 
restoration in Northwestern USA (Chapman et al. 2019: p468) a church property manager 
describes the importance of a creek restoration project for which his congregation has worked 
together on land donated to the church by one of its members.  
What we're doing with the creek restoration [is] getting out there and 
actually planting a tree. Physically it’s good for you because you get in the 
soil, that's good for you. And it’s also good for you for the psychological 
part of it, just being out there and being outside. So, we want to preserve 
that, so we preserve the gardens, the creek, a little bit of the farm and then 
[invite kids from a] school. So [it’s] a place to go and be. (Interview # 16, 
Puget Sound, Nov. 2014) 
In this case a direct relationship between each member (A) and the church community 
(B) is mediated and constituted by their mutual engagement in a meaningful activity of 
restoring of the creek (C). This relational value is eudaimonic in the sense that the 
relationships of one member with the rest of the community in the natural environment is 
‘good for you’ as a result of a common engagement in a meaningful activity. This type of 
contribution to well-being is achieved rather than received, the benefits of ‘getting in the soil’ 
and being outside come with certain responsibilities and tasks, for instance, to continue to 
care for the creek. The common engagement in this meaningful activity strengthens and forms 
each member’s relationships with the rest of the community (B). Restoring this particular 
creek by getting in the soil and being outside together provides not only physical and 
psychological benefits but also connects this community to a particular place. The project also 
allows the church members to build a relationship with kids from a school. In that sense we 
can understand the creek as the object realizing the value of the relationships amongst the 
congregation members and between the church and the school kids. At the same time, church 
members also ascribe direct relational value to the particular creak because of the meaning 
that it has to them not only as the place that strengthens the relationship with the community 
but also as a place in which the individual member connects with nature [Figure 3]. The direct 





the mediated relational value that it has by strengthening the relationship between church 
members.  
 
Example 2: Planting Bananas for Birds 
A second example demonstrates how the Syntax of Environmental Values Framework can be 
applied to indirect values. Here we consider the following quote from another empirical study 
by one of the authors on Costa Rican farmer’s relational values (Chapman et al. 2020).  
Here I planted bananas and quite a few. I eat them and my family [too], but 
we eat maybe one of every 10 that grow. And sometimes the neighbors 
come, and they say ‘the birds are eating the bananas. I want some, please 
give me some bananas’. And I say ‘Yes, get a knife and take a child plant 
and plant it in your garden and in 2 years you will have bananas for 
yourself, because these bananas are for the birds and the birds can’t plant’. 
We are destroying the birds, so I plant bananas here for them. And they 
come here to eat them, and I sit down to watch them (Interview # 20, 
Guanacaste, June 2016) 
Applying our framework, we might focus on the relational value between the farmer 
and the birds as the most salient in this quote. In this case, the farmer (A) values the bananas 
(D) due to their value for the birds (B). We can see the bidirectionality in the direct relational 
value between the farmer (A) and the birds (B): the farmer provides for the birds via planting 
bananas and by encouraging his neighbor to also plant bananas for the birds. In turn, the 
farmer enjoys watching the birds as they come to feed on the bananas. These bananas (D) thus 
have instrumental value for the birds (B) and indirect instrumental value for the farmer (A), 
for whom the birds (B) have direct relational value [Figure 4].  
The quote can also be interpreted as a mediating relational value. The bananas (C) 
mediate or constitute the relationship between the farmer (A) and the birds (B). In that case, 
more emphasis is set on the bananas, these bananas have a particular meaning because they 
were planted for the birds. Perhaps the farmer enjoyed birds and saw that they were being 
harmed by human activities. So therefore, he plants bananas for them. The farmer then feels 
responsible to provide for birds both because we (people) have destroyed their ability to 
forage and because people can plant bananas and birds cannot. In planting the bananas, he 





birds.18 These various interpretations show the importance of considering the context in 
analyzing any example. 
The quote further demonstrates the layered nature of many valuing relations. In this 
case, one of every 10 bananas has a direct instrumental value (as food) for the farmer and his 
family. The other 9 bananas are indirectly instrumentally valuable for the famer and at the 
same time mediate the relational value between the farmer and the birds. Most examples will 
not divide neatly into bananas in this way; the layers of intrinsic, instrumental and relational 
valuing relations may be more difficult to disentangle in many cases. All these different ways 
in which valuing can be interpreted, as well as the ‘layers’ of involved values, are important 
to consider to understand how and why these bananas are important to the farmer. 
 
Future Research Directions 
We hope that the above examples have demonstrated the intended use of the Syntax of 
Environmental Values Framework—as a tool to structure and facilitate thinking about and 
analyzing relational values, but not as a closed model to exclude that which does not fit. To 
this end, a few key points about the limits and potential of this framework are necessary. Our 
framework serves as a model, or a structured way of thinking about the world, but not a full 
representation of values. In practice, most (if not all) relational values will be layered and 
complex, involving more than the simplified parties A, B, C and D in our framework. Equally 
valuable to cases where the framework neatly fits are those where it does not. Relationships 
are dynamic and multi-faceted and the hope with such a framework is to help analyze their 
key features, but not to exclude others.  
To this end, we imagine the Syntax of Environmental Values Framework could 
facilitate research in several directions:  
• What are the webs of relationships across human and non-human entities? (Himes and 
Muraca 2018). Which can be considered as relational values? What does each direction 
entail?  
• While our framework was developed using a particular Western philosophical 
worldview, we recognize that the concept of ‘relational value’ was intended to 
encompass a greater diversity of worldviews. In what cases and to what extent does the 
	





framework help facilitate dialogue with other, including non-Western, knowledge 
systems (Gould et al. 2019)?  
• What is the relationship between principles, preferences and virtues (which are part of the 
relational values definition given in Chan et al 2016) and relational values as we have 
defined them here?  
• What are the implications of bidirectionality for the original ecosystem services or newer 
Nature’s Contributions to People frameworks? Both frameworks are based on a uni-
directional contribution of nature to people. (How) can the concept of bidirectionality (of 
a genuine esteem for the natural entity) be incorporated into these frameworks? For 
example, what might Nature’s Contribution’s to People approach look like if it also 
considers capabilities of peoples to act in accordance with their esteem for natural 
entities?  
• How can the proposed framework help in identifying the lines along which 
environmental conflicts might unfold? For example, different groups in a community 
might value the same environmental object in different ways (for some a forest might be 
instrumental for its income and so substitutable, whereas for others it may have relational 
value and thus not be substitutable)19 A differentiated concept of ‘relational value’ might 
help mediating across different meanings.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this article we introduced an interpretation of relational value starting from environmental 
ethics, considering the most central features attributed to this type of values. We described 
relational values with a bidirectional valuing relation and used the idea of ‘directionality’ as a 
heuristic device to structure analysis. In so doing, we characterized the bidirectional valuing 
relation as including aspects of instrumental and intrinsic valuing. The instrumental aspect 
was depicted with an AßB directionality, because the value is oriented towards the valuing 
subject A; in this direction, object B is valued for its contribution to A’s well-being. At the 
same time, relational valuing involves an intrinsic valuing aspect, depicted by an AàB 
direction when A values B for its own sake. These two aspects are necessarily intertwined in 
relational values. In that sense, it is a eudaimonic contribution to human well-being, where 
well-being as human florishing is achieved by appreciation of object B within a relationship 
	





with B. We refer to this connection, when we say that A values B in virtue of the relationship 
that A has with B or in other words, in case of relational values the content of valuing is the 
relationship. 
The bidirectionality associated with relational values also illustrates how these values 
can be interesting for both anthropocentric and physiocentric positions. An anthropocentrist 
may argue for the importance of relational values with respect to their contribution to human 
well-being and recognize the esteem for B as a particular characterization of this type of well-
being. A physiocentrist might argue the other way around: that esteem for the relationship 
partner, which is valued for its own sake, may be the predominant aspect of relational values 
but in contrast to intrinsic values, the respect associated with relational values is characterized 
by the special relationship in which A stands with B.  
Finally, we introduced the notion of mediating and indirect valuing. If an 
environmental object C is valued by subject A because C mediates a relationship of A with a 
directly valued object B, we speak of C as the bearer of mediating relational value. We speak 
of indirect relational values in cases where an environmental item D is valued by the subject 
A because D has relational value to another valuer B; and where A values D out of 
consideration for B’s values. We close our interpretation and analysis of relational values by 
suggesting a definition:  
Relational values are the values that are ascribed when a valuing subject (A) values an 
object (B) in virtue of the particular relationship in which A stands to B. These values 
are based on a bidirectional valuing relation, which is characterised by a focus on the 
relationship and includes aspects of both instrumental and intrinsic valuing. 
Accordingly, relational valuing contains the appreciation of a contribution of B to A’s 
well-being (instrumental valuing aspect) as well as esteem for the valued object B for 
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Figure 1. Directionality in environmental valuing. Schematic representation of the 
directionality in the valuing relations of different types of environmental values. Arrows 
illustrate how environmental values connect the valuing subject with the valued object, this is 
called the direction of the valuing relation. Each represents a different content of valuing: 
properties of the object for intrinsic values, usefulness for the subject for instrumental, and the 
object’s relationship with the subject for relational. It must not be confused with the direction 
of the valuing process, which always goes from the valuing subject A to the valued object B. 
Arrows are drawn with different patterns to indicate that the instrumental valuing relation is 
not an inversion of the intrinsic valuing relation. Each of the two arrows depicting the relation 
of relational values is thinner than the arrow for the respective one-directional valuing relation 
to illustrate that valuing in case of relational values is not a combination of intrinsic and 








Figure 2. Mediating and indirect environmental values. Schematic representation of the 
directionality in the valuing relation of different types of environmental values involving third 
parties. The A-B valuing relation for indirect values is depicted with dotted lines, because it is 
not the focus of this analysis. 
 
 






Figure 4. Example 2. Schematic representation of one interpretation of valuing relations in 
example 2. 
 
